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An interpretative theory of mind enables young children to grasp that people fulfill
varying intentions when making pictures. We tested the hypothesis that in middle
childhood a unifunctional conception of artists’ intention to produce a picture widens
to include artists’ intention to display their pictures to others. Children aged between
5 and 10 years viewed a brief video of an artist deliberately hiding her picture but her
intention was thwarted when her picture was discovered and displayed. By 8 years
of age children were almost unanimous that a picture-producer without an intention
to show her work to others cannot be considered to be an artist. Further exploratory
studies centered on aspects of picture-display involving normal public display as well
as the contrary intentions of hiding an original picture and of deceitfully displaying a
forgery. Interviews suggested that the concept of exhibition widened to take others’
minds into account viewers’ critical judgments and effects of forgeries on viewers’
minds. The approach of interpolating probes of typical possibilities between atypical
intentions generated evidence that in middle childhood the foundations are laid for a
conception of communication between artists’ minds and viewers’ minds via pictorial
display. The combination of hypothesis-testing and exploratory opening-up of the area
generates a new testable hypothesis about how an increasingly mentalistic approach
enables children to understand diverse possibilities in the pictorial domain.
Keywords: artworks, representation, pictorial theory, theory of mind, intention, exhibition, forgery
INTRODUCTION
An important part of a conception of the pictorial realm is that it encompasses viewers who want
to see pictures, and artists who intend their pictures to be seen. Over much of the life-span, people
have repeated practice at spontaneous monitoring of pictorial intentions. Eventually, repetition
generates representations available to conscious awareness (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) which then
become everyday assumptions which researchers try to identify (Parsons, 1987). The present
investigation focuses on how children rely on their theory of mind to make sense of diversity
within the pictorial domain, spanning typical and atypical exemplars. The advantage of acquiring
a complex theory of mind in furthering an understanding of diversity was one of the central points
made by Wellman (1990; see also Myers and Liben, 2012; Hartley and Allen, 2014). Children
learn to understand that human beings “use cultural tools for leaving an intentional trace of
their communicative and cognitive acts” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, p. 139). In the first part of
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the investigation reported below we tested a reformulation of the
proposal that children come increasingly to conceptualize artists
and viewers as linked in a common communicative endeavor
(Freeman, 2000, 2011). Our reformulation is the strong version
of that, namely that during middle childhood, the children go
beyond (a) representing artist and viewer as linked separate
agents, and (b) integrate the two aspects of agency into a
representation of someone who intends both to produce and
to display pictures. We test that, then present two exploratory
studies which serve an advisory function in how to advance on
the test in the next round of research to encompass artists who
cheat by displaying a forgery.
Mentalistic reasoning is a way of combining interrelated
concepts of belief, desire, emotion, and intention which are
integral to an understanding of mind. The child learns to extend
mentalistic reasoning to encompass a variety of relations between
agents and their world (Bloom, 2002). Agents’ effects on the
world are understandable in the light of how agents’ intentions
are (a) activated by their desires, and (b) shaped into plans by
agents’ beliefs about how to fulfill the intentions (Wellman, 1990).
Such reasoning is necessary for understanding artifacts that the
agents produce (see Keil, 1989, p. 49 on ‘The need for intention’).
Pictures are ubiquitous artifacts. Mentalistic reasoning by viewers
is “an appropriate response to the central fact about art: that it is
an intentional manifestation of mind” (Wollheim, 1993, p. 134;
also Bloom and Markson, 1998; Freeman, 2000, 2008). Artists
produce pictures non-arbitrarily, influenced to varying extents
by the artists’ conception of viewers’ minds. Artists typically
do not just intend to produce pictures but to display them to
others. It is only through understanding intentions to display that
children can come to understand their own everyday pictorial
environment. That is, at some point in understanding the world
of pictures, the child progresses beyond (a) a unifunctional
concept of the typical artist intending to produce pictures, to
(b) a plurifunctional concept of the typical artist intending both
to produce pictures and to have them seen. It is at present
not known when such insight is acquired and integrated with
other insights about the pictorial domain. What is known is that
the end-state of development, an untutored adult theory of art,
does incorporate mentalistic reasoning centering on intention.
Pictures often seem automatically to trigger a search for what
the artist intended (Jucker et al., 2014), thereby enhancing
the viewers’ liking for the pictures (Jucker and Barrett, 2011).
Presumably the increased liking in turn reinforces the search for
intention. Indeed, naïve viewers may be too intention-minded.
Rosset (2008) formulated a model in which adults habitually
monitor others’ actions for evidence of intentions (see also Moore
and Pope, 2014) and the monitoring incorporates a positivity
bias: when asked to interpret an action, intentions are ascribed
more than they should be. It is true that it may be a mistake
for viewers to rely too heavily on what artists seem to intend,
because some artist intentions may be limited as guides to
pictorial interpretation (Beardsley, 1981, 1982; Davies, 2013), and
artists may err in their suppositions about how viewers react
to the art-display (see Salfner and Voigtmann, 1999). However,
identification of artist intentions is useful to viewers even if only
to serve to generate useful heuristics for interpretation. A prime
task for research is to identify how an understanding of artists’
intentions develops.
As is usual in research on mentalistic reasoning, it has been
found that important advances in monitoring pictorial intention
occur in the preschool years. Preschoolers, when they find a
picture unclear, tend to infer what the artist may have intended
(Browne and Woolley, 2001). Children as young as 30 months
of age spontaneously monitor an artist’s gaze while she draws
an object; and when taught a name for the drawing (“This is a
spoodle!”) children map the novel word to the real object the
artist had apparently intended to draw (Preissler and Bloom,
2008), see also Preissler and Bloom (2008) on 2-years-old, and
Salsa and de Mendoza (2007) and German and Johnson (2009) on
3-years-old. Thereafter, a mentalistic stance on depiction widens
to incorporate further insights into agency (Gelman and Ebeling,
1998; Callaghan and Rochat, 2003, 2008; Freeman, 2008, 2011;
Hartley and Allen, 2014). Perhaps it is not until at least 7 years
of age that children undertaking pictorial interpretation may
normally consider the mind of the viewer in relation to the mind
of an artist (see Golomb, 1992). Accordingly, we should look to
middle childhood to identify the foundation of plurifunctional
thinking about intention. We followed the suggestion by Freeman
and Allen (2013) of setting puzzles which involve intentions that
are contrary to the typical possibilities in the pictorial domain.
Study 1 tested the hypothesis that middle childhood
encompasses when children replace (a) a unifunctional
conception of an artist as someone who produces a picture,
with (b) a plurifunctional conception of an artist as someone who
both intends to produce and to display a picture to others. A new
method was needed. We adapted the foundational false-belief
experiment in theory of mind in which an agent hides something
which is subsequently found and removed by someone else.
Children watched a brief video in which an artist atypically hides
one of her pictures from view, then a friend finds the picture
and, unbeknownst to the artist, thwarts the artist’s intention
by putting the picture on display in a museum (in Italy, museo
covers both museum and gallery as in The Tate Gallery and
the Museum of Modern Art). The child was asked questions,
amongst which were three target questions of (a) what people
would think of someone who hid her own beautiful picture, (b)
whether it is important for an artist to display her picture, and
(c) whether it is necessary for an artist to display her picture.
We predict that 5-years-old would unifunctionally judge that
the artist had fulfilled her role simply by producing the picture.
Ten-years-old would plurifunctionally judge that artists are
expected to bear in mind the needs of viewers. An open question
is whether the 8-years-old would resemble the younger or older
groups.
Study 2 investigated children’s conception of what makes
a picture worth displaying, asking whether (a) beauty, (b)
authorship, or (c) critical opinion were most important in judging
a picture. The firm prediction from Parsons (1987) is that 5-
years-old’ thinking is dominated by the question of how beautiful
a picture is. Older children can safely be predicted to move
toward a plurifunctional judgment, encompassing both which
artist produces the picture, and experienced viewers’ opinion
that the picture is worth displaying. This aspect of the study is
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exploratory, designed to open the area where, interestingly, the
typical rate of development has not yet been identified.
Study 3 involved a converse of hiding something, namely
atypical display of something misleading. The question is whether
deliberate display of a forgery disqualifies an artist from a claim to
the role, in a similar way to refusal to exhibit an original. Forgery
poses one of the most complex topics for naïve pictorial reasoning
that accounts of the domain currently encompass (see Bullot and
Reber, 2013). We asked children what is wrong with a forgery,
and whether they themselves would put a forgery on display.
Children’s reasons for their judgments should suggest whether
an explicitly mentalistic conception of an authentic display piece
arises before the end of middle childhood and facilitate the
formulation of a testable hypothesis.
To conclude, the investigation below involved three distinct
types of study in a repeated-measures design. Questions were
formulated within semi-structured interviews, many of them
required yes/no answers, thus facilitating quantitative analysis
where the alpha level can be set very high. Another essential part
of the approach is to identify mentalistic reasoning irrespective of
whether the child answered a question affirmatively or negatively.
The overall approach thus employs frequency data and qualitative
data in complementary fashion (see Freeman and Parsons, 2001)
to identify whether, in the 5-years span of middle childhood,
a shift toward mentalistic reasoning characterizes children’s
approach to the pictorial domain.
STUDY 1: DOES A
PICTURE-PRODUCER’S ROLE INVOLVE
DISPLAYING PICTURES?
Participants
We interviewed 30 Italian urban children: 10 5-years-old (six
girls, four boys), 10 8-years-old (four girls, six boys), and 10 10-
years-old (six girls, four boys). The studies were performed under
the ethical guidelines of the American Psychological Association
and the Italian Association of Psychologists. In accordance with
the APA (2010), the participants’ parents gave their written
informed consent to the experimental procedure. Anonymity of
data was also guaranteed. There were no conflicts of interest
that could have prejudiced the conduct or presentation of this
investigation at any stage.
Procedure
Children began with a session designed to establish rapport and
to familiarize the children with the topic of pictorial judgment.
First, the experimenter talked informally with the children,
asking about their tastes in to drawings, paintings, and color-
preferences. The interviewer specified an interested in what the
children think about some artistic issues, and that there are
no right or wrong answers to the questions that will be asked.
Children were then interviewed individually in a quiet room for
about 15 min.
The interview began with viewing a purpose-made silent video
(duration: 2.10 min) in their classroom. There were two people in
the video, neither of whom was a professional actress. In scene 1,
a woman sits at a table, painting. She then puts down her brush,
looks at her picture with a satisfied expression, then hides it in
the drawer of the table, and leaves the room. In scene 2, another
woman enters the room and looks around. She opens the drawer,
and finds the picture. She looks at it, smiles, and exits taking the
picture with her. In scene 3, a building with a sign “Museum” on
it is shown. The woman enters and hangs the picture she took
from the drawer on a wall in the museum.
The following six questions in colloquial Italian were asked in
randomized order:
To be identified as an artist, is it necessary to exhibit your
works in a museum?
Must the artist show her works to other people?
Is it important for the artist to exhibit her pictures?
In order to become famous, does an artist have to exhibit her
works in a museum?
If I paint a very beautiful painting and I keep it hidden at home,
will people think I am an artist or not?
If you create a work of art and you do not show it in a museum,
are you an artist or not?
Results
The data of interest in this study were only whether children
answered yes or no, not the details of the reasons given by the
children. Note that each question wording required a yes or no
answer, but the children were free to add spontaneous comments
about their reasoning. If the added comments obscured the
child’s position on a question, the interviewer said that he
understood and again asked the question in the manner that
someone would who was checking that they indeed understood.
For example, after the question “In order to become famous,
does an artist have to exhibit her works in a museum?” one
10-years-old child replied: “I do not know, the museum is
important, and an artist must exhibit his work there, but can
also put it on the internet, or in the street.” The researcher
then asked: “So do you think the artist must set out her
works in a museum?” and the child replied “No, not only
in the museum but also in other places.” Accordingly, that
child’s answer was scored as No. Assurance was needed that
the answers were consistent with the question; therefore the
children’s verbalizations were analyzed by three judges. They
conducted a preliminary individual analysis on each child’s
answers, and then, where necessary, discussed the matter until
they reached a unanimous decision (Losito, 1993). Note that
the interviewer and judges worked blind to the data-plan used
for Section “Results” of the present paper; and the person who
drafted that plan and the account worked blind to any details of
the data-emergence.
The data-analysis below is quantitative, with qualitative issues
confined to illustrative status in examples of answers given below
for the purpose of information to show how children were
expressing judgments.
With Bonferroni correction, an alpha level of 0.008 was set.
The two older groups maintained that artists must show their
pictures to others (19/20 children, binomial p < 0.001, whereas
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the youngest group denied it by a small majority (6/10 children,
binomial chance). The results were identical for a randomly
inserted weaker variant question in which it was not asked
whether display was necessary but rather whether display was
important. The data are set out in Table 1. The results were
identical for the video-related question of whether other people
will think that an artist who keeps a beautiful painting hidden
is an artist. To give an indication of the reasoning of the most
articulate of the children, the 10-years-old, three examples are: “If
you paint a beautiful picture and you keep it hidden at home, you
are not an artist for others, because artists show their pictures.”
Again: “To become an artist a person must show his works of
art to the others, if he keep them hidden at home, he will never
become an artist because [. . .] the others are the ones who can tell
whether he is an artist or not.” And again: “For example, we went
to the seaside and we saw on the street one guy who was painting
some poster with spray paint and then he was selling them. He
was an artist.”
In sum, whichever of the three target questions was asked, the
two older groups had integrated the intention to display with that
of production. It will be economical to defer to the discussion the
question of whether the use of systematically varied repetition of
questions bears on how strong those data might be.
Scanning down the columns of Table 1, it is evident that
the 10-years-old were unanimous for 4/6 questions asked, and
showed a majority of 7/10 and 8/10 for the remaining two
questions. A score of only five deviations from unanimity over
60 answers exceeds expectations of finding firm effects. Clearly,
for the children, whilst it is desirable to put a picture in a
museum, all agreeing that it is an indicator of fame, a museum
is seen as a vehicle for display not as end in itself. Here, are
three representative extracts from the older children to illustrate
the type of data sustaining the above summary results on their
unanimity: “It is not necessary to show them in a museum, the
artist can also show them at home, he can invite some people
at home. . .the important thing is to show them.” Again; “If
you want to become famous, you must show them . . . but it
depends: if you want to show them, all right, if you want to
show only part of them, all right. . .it’s you who decides.” And
again: “It is not always necessarily a museum, it is possible to
exhibit also in an art-gallery or in a private exposition. . .even
in the street to show art, to show how beautiful art is, so that
more people maybe learn about art. It is to promote art.” It
appears that here a basic criterion for being an artist concerns
the gaze of others, independently of where the communication
from artist to viewer actually occurs. Turning now to the 5-years-
old, it is evident that their answers are far from unanimity, always
being a 6-4 or 7-3 split. The 8-years-old reassuringly present
an intermediate state of affairs between the 5- and 10-years-old
results.
To sum up, the results are as predicted from the strong version
of Freeman’s position. That is, the evidence from the very first
trial show that children during middle childhood the children
integrate artist and viewer as into a representation of someone
who intends both to produce and to display pictures. What we
could not have predicted was the age at which that integration
was evident.
STUDY 2: MAKING AN INFORMED
JUDGMENT ABOUT TYPICAL
POSSIBILITIES
The next study focused on typical possibilities in the pictorial
domain. One topic centered on what is decisive in judging
a picture worthy of display, over the span from its origin of
production, its quality as a product, and the subsequent mentality
of art-critics. Critics are supposed to make up their minds on
what is deemed worth exhibiting. The second topic highlighted
the question of beauty that is a criterion in everyday naïve
esthetics (Freeman, 2004; McManus, 2011). Asking questions
about pictorial beauty been used to identify a developmental
trend (Parsons, 1987), from the age of 5 years onward (Freeman
and Parsons, 2001). The trend is particularly useful for normative
purposes to check whether a sample seems to be typical or
precocious.
Procedure
After a short break, the child was again interviewed back in the
same quiet room for about 15 min. Children were asked five
randomized questions (note that the Italian superlative was used
in the first three questions listed below, but acts less radically
than in English, i.e., is an intensifier of X with the sense of
‘extremely X’).
What is extremely important when judging a work of art? Is it
how beautiful it is?
What is extremely important when judging a work of art? Is it
who made it?
What is extremely important when judging a work of art? Is it
the judgments of art-critics?
Does a work of art made by a famous artist have more value
than one made by an unknown person?
Is beauty the only thing that matters in judging a work of art?
The method of conducting the interview and coding of
responses is the same as in the previous study.
Results
Table 2 contains two cells where one of the questions was
omitted, because the 5-years-old did not know what the term
‘art-critic’ meant. Setting those cells aside, scanning the top
rows of Table 2 reveals that all the 5-years-old favored beauty
as a criterion for judgment (binomial p = 0.001, beyond the
Bonferroni-corrected alpha of 0.01), reassuringly in line with
Parsons (1987) insistence on young children’s prioritization of
beauty. As one child commented “It is art because it is beautiful.”
In contrast, 9/10 of the 10-years-old identified authorship as a
criterion for judgment (binomial p = 0.001), and divided 7-
3 on beauty (binomial p = 0.50). Thus a reversal occurred
between the youngest and oldest groups. Again, the 8-years-old
were intermediate and sometimes made complex judgments, e.g.,
“When you judge a painting the beauty is important. First of
all you see if it is beautiful or ugly. Then it is also important to
know who the author is.” Using beauty as a criterion, the sample
appears developmentally congruent with that of Freeman and
Sanger (1995) for this most common of esthetic considerations.
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TABLE 1 | Frequency of answers in Study 1.
Age group (years)
5 8 10
In order to be identified as an artist, is it necessary to exhibit your works in a museum?
Yes, it is necessary for an artist to exhibit in a museum if they are to be considered an artist 4 5 7
An artist has to exhibit but not only in a museum, even in other places 6 5 3
Must an artist show her works to others?
Yes, it is necessary for an artist to show his works to others 4 9 10
No, the artist is an artist even if he doesn’t show his works 6 1 0
Is it important for an artist to exhibit?
Yes, it is important for an artist to exhibit his works to others 4 9 10
No, it is not important for him to exhibit his works to others, it’s 6 1 0
To became famous, does an artist have to exhibit her works in a museum?
Yes, a famous artist exhibits in a museum 7 7 10
No, a famous artist exhibits not always in a museum but also at home or on the roadside 3 3 0
If I do a beautiful painting and keep it hidden at home, do people think I‘m an artist or not?
If I paint, I am an artist even if I don’t exhibit 6 1 0
If I am a true artist I have to show and exhibit my works 4 9 10
If you create a work of art and don’t show it in a museum, are you an artist or not?
If I create a work of art I must exhibit it in a museum to be considered an artist 4 7 8
If I create a work of art I don’t have to exhibit it in a museum, to be considered an artist I must be skilled 6 3 2
TABLE 2 | Frequency of answers to What is most important when judging
a work of art?
Age group (years)
5 8 10
Beauty YES
NO
10
–
6
4
7
3
Authorship YES
NO
–
–
6
4
9
1
Judgments of art-critics YES
NO
–
–
8
2
8
2
The 10-years-old were almost unanimous (9/10, binomial
p = 0.001) that it is extremely important to know who was the
painter when judging a picture: “If you don’t know the story of
that person, if he was sick. . ., you cannot understand the story
of the painting.” Turning now to the role of art-critics, in the
older two groups 16/20 children (binomial p = 0.006) endorsed
critics’ importance even given the considerations of beauty and
of authorship: “When you have to evaluate an artwork, it is
important to ask advice from art critics . . .if you do not know
it, the picture loses a part of its value.” Art critics were described
as experts, authorized personnel who can transmit judgments:
“Knowing what the art experts think is important because they
understand better than you. . .they can help you. I would surely
listen to them”; and “. . .they are experts about these things and
they know a lot more things than me.” The results are not quite as
strong as the unanimity that was evident in Study 1 on the basic
concept of a viewer. Presumably, extension to informed critical
viewer judgment is still in process of formation.
Finally, authorship was again asked about as shown in Table 3.
The 5-years-old almost all (9/10, binomial p= 0.001) denied that
TABLE 3 | Frequency of answers to Is a work of art by a famous artist
more valuable than one made by an unknown artist? and Is beauty the
only thing that matters in judging a work of art?
Age group (years)
5 8 10
A work of art made by a famous
artist has more value than one
made by an unknown author?
YES
NO
1
9
8
2
7
3
Is beauty the only element that
matters in judging a work of
art?
YES
NO
9
1
8
2
7
3
it mattered to the value who produced an artwork, but again the
older groups lacked unanimity. And when a forced question-form
was used, asking whether beauty is all that matters in judging a
picture, again the youngest were almost unanimous in judging
that it was all that matters (9/10, binomial p = 0.001), and the
older groups were divided. Examples of older children’s reasoning
is as follows: “Knowing what the art critics think is important,
because with a positive judgment a picture increases its value,
whereas with a negative judgment its value decreases.” Again:
“Yes, knowing who the author is. . . yes, because it lets you know
something more about the picture. . .it gets across to you also
the story of the picture, since you could also ask for information
from the author. Each painting is unique also because the artist
transmits his narrative through the painting.”
To sum up, the results are as predicted from Parsons’
work on children’s understanding of art in that the youngest
children’s thinking was predictably dominated by the question of
beauty regardless of authorship; and three-quarters of the older
children’s reasoning had developed beyond that. What we could
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TABLE 4 | Frequency of answers to questions in Study 3.
Age group (years)
5 8 10
Is it important that a museum exhibit artists’ original works?
Yes, the museum must exhibit only original works 10 10 10
No 0 0 0
Is a fake as valuable as an original picture?
Yes 0 0 0
No, the original is more important 10 10 10
Would you show a fake in a museum or an art gallery? Why?
I would exhibit original paintings because the public might lose trust in the
museum
1 8 6
I would exhibit original paintings because it’s wrong to cheat visitors 9 2 4
Why a fake is not ok? What is the problem with a fake?
Faking it is wrong because it’s cheating to copying what the others made 10 7 6
The forger doesn’t prove his ability and creativity 0 3 4
not have predicted was the degree of diversity of thinking in the
older children.
The next study forms a converse of the first study, whereby
instead of hiding an original picture an artist puts a forgery
on display. The technique is to tell the children of a skilled
forger, Van Meegeren, then to interview the children about what
is wrong with forgery. The aspect of interest is whether the
children give unqualified moral reasons (forgery is wrong in
some respect) or whether they give mentalistic answers in terms
of the effects of forgery on viewers’ minds. A conception that
it is authentic products that can be displayed in a museum
becomes incorporated into a naïve theory of art (Newman and
Bloom, 2012; see also Cavanagh et al., 2013; Seeley, 2013). Young
children condemn passing off someone else’s originality as one’s
own even if the children themselves like the copy (Frazier and
Gelman, 2009). The assumption yet again is that there will be
a developmental shift evident after the age of 5 years in the
direction of mentalistic reasons being given by the children for
their judgments.
STUDY 3: THE PRODUCTION OF
FALSITY IN PICTURE-PRODUCTION
AND DISPLAY
Procedure
The children were shown images of two paintings (printed in
color in A4 format), one original, “The Milkmaid” by Vermeer,
and the other one forged (falso), “Supper at Emmaus” by Van
Meegeren. While showing Vermeer’s painting, children were
told about the peculiarities of the artist’s style. In showing the
forgery, children were told in non-evaluative language about Van
Meegeren’s history, highlighting his intention to copy perfectly
the style of another artist, to pretend to be him, and the fact that
once the truth came out the picture then lost monetary value.
Ten-minute interviews were then individually given, in a quiet
schoolroom, with four randomized questions:
Is it important that a museum exhibit the original works of an
artist?
Is a fake equally as valuable as an original picture?
Would you show a fake in a museum or an art gallery? Why?
Why is a fake not OK? What is the problem with a fake?
The method of conducting the interview and coding of
responses for the first questions was the same as in the previous
studies. In addition, for the last two questions, the judges were
asked to undertake a content analysis and to create two modal
categories, afterward to assign each answer to one or the other
category.
Results
With Bonferroni correction, an alpha level of 0.01 was set. We
begin with the two questions that served as a check for whether
the children had understood the scenario. The children had been
told that the picture had lost its monetary value when found
to be a forgery, and when the question ‘Is a forgery equally as
valuable as an original picture?’ was asked as a control question,
the judges were unanimous that all 30 children passed (binomial
p = 0.001) as shown in Table 4. Secondly, every child affirmed
that a museum must show only originals (binomial p = 0.001),
and the switch from affirmative to negative here rules out simple
response-bias as a potential confounding.
Accordingly, given the response agreements, it is now feasible
to ask whether the children all give the same reason for why
museums avoid forgeries. Is it merely because originals are worth
more? Children’s answers were clear and the judges easily picked
out the same two categories. One category was confidence in
the museum that chooses what to display, e.g., an 8 years-old
said, “The museum is an important place and the paintings that
are there are important and chosen to show them to visitors
and those who go there trusting in the museum.” The second
category concerned the rightful display of only original paintings,
representative of the artists’ creativity. Table 4 reveals a cross-over
in the reasons offered. Of the 5-years-old, 9/10 took up a moral
position, asserting that it was wrong to cheat viewers, whilst the
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remaining child took up the mentalistic position that it might
cause viewers to lose trust. In contrast, the 8-years-old split in the
reverse direction by 2-8 (the cross-over is significant at p < 0.01,
Fisher test). Clearly some important development was occurring.
However, in that light we do not know why the 10-years-old split
nearly 50-50, at 6-4. One looks to the final remaining question
for possible illumination. The question ‘What is wrong with a
forgery?’ proved interesting in three respects. First, not a single
child answered in impersonal terms of the loss of monetary value
compared to an original, and the majority, 23/30, confirmed that
what is wrong with a fake is that it involves cheating (binomial
p = 0.003), with all 10 of the 5-years-old asserting that anti-
cheating moral position (binomial p = 0.001). Secondly, the
8-years-old again were less than unanimous but this time with
the majority going in the 5-years-old direction with 7/10 asserting
a moral position, so no great development is manifest. The 10-
years-old were again split, with 6/10 asserting the moral position,
so the 10-years-old split on the previously tabulated question
looks less aberrant. Thirdly, the seven non-moral answers from
both the older groups, a third of the older groups, are interesting.
All seven children asserted that forgery was wrong because
forgers disadvantage themselves by not being able to display
their skills as an original artist. That reason is of particular
interest because the story had made explicit how the forgery had
indeed enabled the forger to show skill with the paintbrush. To
the best of our knowledge, that aspect of an early view of the
importance of originality in artwork has not been documented
in the psychological or art-education literature (though see Wolz,
2014, for a pioneering study involving perception of talent in
original artists and forgers).
To sum up, the results are exploratory and contain a
diversity of children’s reasons for their judgments. The use of
a transgressive act of picture-display, a forgery, provoked the
diversity in line with the suggestion of Freeman and Allen (2013).
It will be interesting to use the results to compile a set of forced-
choice options to present to children.
DISCUSSION
In Study 1, three variants of a target question probed whether
artists intended to show their work to others. The finding was that
8-years-old had replaced (a) a unifunctional categorisation of an
artist simply as a picture-producer, in favor of (b) a categorisation
of an artist as an agent who is linked to viewers. Previously,
Maridaki-Kassotaki and Freeman (2000) had identified the
emergence of a critical mentalistic theory of art unifying picture-
production and picture-display at preadolescence. The new
finding suggests that one should look to even younger children
for a conceptual transition. Where Freeman (2004, 2011) had
identified the conceptual challenge facing children, we can now
add that 8-years-old rise to the challenge by firmly integrating the
role of viewer with the role of artist. Study 2 investigated whether
(a) beauty, (b) authorship, or (c) critical opinion were most
important in judging a picture. The results confirmed the focus
on pictorial beauty by 5-years-old predicted from the literature
inaugurated by Parsons (1987). Beyond that age, the study served
to open the field of possibilities of developmental change, and
here, respect for the minds of art-critics emerged in 16/20
older children (p < 0.001, binomial), pertaining to one of the
highest levels of mentalistic engagement with pictures identified
by Bullot and Reber (2013). Again, the majority of 8-years-
old were revealed to be mentalistic reasoners. Study 3 found a
cross-over in reasons given for why forgery is unacceptable. Five-
years-old were unanimous that it is wrong to cheat, whilst the
8-years-old were incorporating a mentalistic concept of viewers
losing trust in the authority of the museum. To the best of our
knowledge, documentation of that acquisition is not to be found
in the experimental literature. Nor is the sign, in a third of the
older groups, of awareness of forgery as hampering the artist
in demonstrating artistry, despite the preceding briefing on van
Megeeren having mentioned his assiduity and skill.
Before discussing implications of the evidence, it is essential
to evaluate the quality of the evidence. It will be economical to
focus the questions whenever feasible to the particular study they
bear on most cogently, rather than repeat the discussion for every
detail in the repeated-measures design.
Sample Characteristics
The most general question of all is whether the sample of
children had any developmentally atypical characteristics? The
concern is whether the complex cultural context within which
the sample grew up might make the data normatively of limited
value. Might the children have been culturally led into an
atypical developmental pathway? The sample was made up of
urban Italian children in a country with the richest pictorial
art collection in Europe. The context of the investigation is
thus one of familiarity with art display. We suggest that the
consideration is plausible, but two pieces of evidence ameliorate
the concern. First, there is no evidence that Italian children
become pushed to any conceptual extreme by their exposure
to art: thus, Ruggi and Gilli (1998) found that Italian children
still took their criteria for what is beautiful and good from
nature instead of from pictures. Secondly, there was the focus
on beauty predicted from previous work in other cultures, with
both a pictorially representative sample (Parsons, 1987) and a
pictorially disadvantaged sample (Freeman and Sanger, 1995)
That focus on beauty was shown in the 5-years-old and held
up under forced-choice questioning in Study 2: beauty was
all-important and authorship was irrelevant. The conclusion
is that there seems to be no normative disadvantage in using
the sample. On the contrary, there is the advantage that
Italian children find it conversationally natural to talk about
art and the display of art without floundering. That has three
consequences. First, it is easy to establish and maintain rapport
over the topic. Secondly, children readily acquire a pictorial
vocabulary with which to formulate their judgments, e.g., a
distinction between pictures in general (disegni, illustrazione)
and display-pieces (quadri). The availability of the distinction
makes it easy to focus on display, which was the target of
Study 1. The distinction appears also in Spanish, which would
perhaps be first choice for systematic replication. Finally, as was
noted previously, it was never necessary to rephrase any of the
questions.
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Sample Size
The question is whether the trade-off between sample size and
lengthy testing may have been too one-sided: sample sizes of
10 per age-group were small. Yet the data in the primary
study, Study 1, were compelling in terms of level of probability
with Bonferroni-protected p. In particular, given that only 1/20
children in the older groups was an exception to unanimity that
an artist must display pictures, we suggest that the data were
strong enough for their purpose. Conventionally, p < 0.001 is
generally acceptable. It would be encouraging if future research
found that small samples were adequate to expose robust effects
at the level of individuals.
Individual Consistency under Repeated
Questioning
In any investigation which relies on extended work with children,
the hope is that each child remains in a fairly stable state as a data-
generator (e.g., not becoming tired or self-conscious). In that
light, there are two procedural points about any investigation, two
advantages to repetition and two dangers to be tested for. We shall
take these six considerations in order.
One procedural points is to avoid blurring the distinction
between new and old questions, so that it should always be
discursively clear when one is opening a new topic without any
implicit pressure to recall what has already been said in the
interview. The other procedural point is to introduce changes in
topic if feasible to maintain interest and again to help minimize
carry-over effects. Both of these were incorporated into the
present investigation, by (a) never having literal repetition of
any question, and (b) interpolating Study 2 on non-mental states
between the two target-issue studies. We propose that the present
investigation conforms to those two requirements.
The first advantage to a long procedure lies in not having
repeatedly to establish rapport. It is easy to monitor rapport,
once it is established, and with increasing acquaintance with the
child it is easy to maintain rapport. We noticed no failure in
the process, in particular no drop-out threatened to occur. The
second advantage lies in the stability of the sample: is that there is
no need to check whether the introduction of each new individual
into the investigation is adding noise to the corpus of evidence
by virtue of their developmental status or their context (e.g.,
noisier classroom or anxiety-ridden school). We conclude that
the present investigation has those advantages.
We finally consider the two dangers: (a) that an individual’s
answers may be unstable under repeated questioning, and (b) the
converse danger that an uninformative uniformity is inculcated.
Let us take these in order. Rose and Blank (1974) proposed
that children, if they think that they are being asked a similar
question twice because they had given the wrong answer before,
will be liable mechanically to change their answer (see Siegal,
1997, for a discussion of five alternative explanations of the
effect). Yet in Study 1, the target data went in the opposite
direction to the Rose-Blank effect: all the children gave their
particular answer each time over the three related questions.
Note that the consistency necessarily means that the children
gave their particular answer on the very first time of asking, so
the judgment cannot be attributed to any unwanted order-effect.
However, there is another opportunity to raise the repetition
question, in Study 2. The older children’s judgments were marked
by unpredicted diversity. Might that diversity be an aspect of the
Rose-Blank instability of answering, only this time at the sample
level rather than within an individual’s sequence of answers? Yet
there was less reiteration than in Study 1; and if reiteration was
not a problem in Study 1, there is no apparent reason why it
should obtrude with two of the groups in Study 2. That leaves
two possibilities. On the one hand, maybe the diversity is a sign
that children were in the process of taking into account disparate
considerations, much as Freeman (2000, 2004, 2011) has argued.
On the other hand, maybe there is potential unanimity which is
obscured by the procedure of enquiring into typical possibilities.
Certainly the analytic power of investigating atypical possibilities
was the rationale in theory of mind research, leading to the
focus on false beliefs. Either way, the primary purpose of Study
2 was only to delimit an area of testable possibilities in children’s
conception of display.
Lastly, in Study 2, the children might recall Study 1 and come
to infer a theme and a core interest of the adult. Might that lead
to children giving mechanically compliant answers? Study 1 had
been centered on picture-display, so in Study 2 we deliberately
avoided posing any question about the importance of display.
There was no basis for a desired answer to be inferred about
whether it mattered if a picture was beautiful or not. That enabled
us to document the predicted beauty-centered criterion in the
younger children. In Study 3 after denying the value of a forgery,
all the children affirmed that a museum must show only originals.
That could be compliance. However, that affirmation was merely
a check on whether the children understood the problem. The
actual data, the reasons they gave for their judgment, had no basis
in priming form Study 1. So those data are suitable to serve an
advisory role for the next step in research. We conclude that we
can rule out simple compliance as a complicating factor.
In sum, while no method can be perfect, we conclude that the
present approach is safe from the major problems of repeated
interview, and that it benefits from the commonest precautions.
In particular, the crucial target data from Study 1 were consistent
right from the very first question, so could not have become
weakened by uninformative instability or compliance. It is
straightforward to try replication on that. For the rest of the study,
we do not suggest attempted literal replication: it would be far
more informative to do systematic replication.
Setting the Novelty of the Approach in
Context
The most general question is whether it is worth continuing the
present approach in future. To answer that it is necessary to
consider (a) what continuity there is with previous approaches,
set against (b) what innovation is in the present approach. It
seemed reasonable to use adopt a common procedure which
slowly increased children’s involvement. The procedure began
with a simple scenario which breaks the norm of an artist’s role
in displaying pictures by having an artist hide a picture. That
formed a single target-question test, rather in the economical way
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that a false-belief test does, involving some mismatch with an
expectation. That target test was preceded only by the rapport
phase. The ease of establishing rapport over the topic means
that there is no serious doubt over the complementary worry
that children might not have warmed up. The final target study
continued the theme of norm-breaking by focusing on displaying
a forgery. The data-processing was refocused on whether or not
children mentioned any uncued mentalistic considerations. The
essential innovation was to center each study on the concept of
pictorial display. Whilst the role of an artist is naturally concerned
with picture-production, the role of a viewer can only be carried
out once a picture is put on display. So, if one is to study the
child’s conception of relations between picture, artist, viewer, and
their world (Freeman, 2008), it is important to investigate the
child’s conception of a relation between artist and viewer whereby
an artist hands over a picture for display which then makes it
possible for someone else be a viewer. We conclude that the
method seems suitable for extension to child’s conception of what
intentions a viewer should have if they wish to understand the
minds of the artists, and their pictures.
Development of the Method
In that light, it is worth raising the question whether the method
should continue to avoid giving mentalistic cues. The protocols
were made to contain as few explicit verbal mentalistic cues
as feasible, as did Maridaki-Kassotaki and Freeman, 2000 when
investigating spontaneous mentalistic conceptions of a pictorial
display-piece. It is empirically possible that the children have
deeper mentalistic formulations which might be activated by
cues. It is, however, important to study spontaneous uncued
conceptions because those provide an immediate point of entry
for art-educational intervention. There are psychological lessons
to be learned from art education attempts to promote and
influence children’s theory of art (Freeman, 2008; Freeman and
Allen, 2013). We suggest that a useful research strategy is to
employ the following converse methods. With older children’s
spontaneous reasoning, it is worth documenting spontaneous
reasoning as widely as possible with cues. With preschoolers,
where the salience of pictorial intention is documented (Bloom
and Markson, 1998), it is worth concentrating on methods
designed to identify implicit conceptions below the level of
awareness where the preschoolers cannot access them for
themselves (much as has been done for false-belief tests: Freeman
et al., 1991; Clements and Perner, 1994; Freeman and Lacohée,
1995; Clements et al., 2000; Schneider et al., 2015). Presumably
one way forward is to continue the adaptations of a false-belief
design as in Study 1 which delivered the crucial yes/no data on
children’s conceptual integration of artist and viewer.
Theoretical Implications: Mentalistic
Reasoning
A viewer may be a passive beholder of a picture or an
active agent attempting to become involved in the artist’s
experience. The issue of artists’ and viewers’ intentions is hugely
important as an aspect of agency. Note that mentalistic concepts
are interdependent: one should consider an intention to do
something along with (a) a desire to do something, and (b) a
belief that something is worth the attempt. The present approach
is necessarily not solely about intention to the exclusion of other
components of mentalistic reasoning. However, the concept of
intention is fundamental because intention is at the origin of
action-plans. The agent who implements an action plan and
creates an artifact is a key component of everyday reasoning
about who has priority in ownership of the artifact (Levene et al.,
2015). There is a suggestion from Study 3 about how 8-years-old
may distinguish between authentic pieces and forgeries. The issue
of forgery becomes interesting here because creation is divided
between two agents. One agent creates the original and another
agent creates the forgery. The two agents have distinct intentions
toward a viewer. We predict that 8-years-old will segregate their
intentional concepts of artist and forger, judging that an artist
who does not display her picture cannot be regarded as an artist
but that a non-displaying forger is still a forger.
A second developmental question is whether young children
put too much weight on intention as though it dictated how a
picture must be interpreted. Bloom and Markson (1998) argued
that for preschoolers, if a picture-producer has the intention of
representing a balloon by a circle and line, that shape cannot then
represent a lollipop. For preschoolers, intention thus restricts
pictorial possibilities. We suggest that it is timely to investigate
when the restriction is overcome, and an understanding of
intention then becomes a resource for children. It has long been
recognized that even very young children have the experience
not only of forming clear pictorial intentions, but of changing
intentions during the course of drawing (Freeman and Adi-Japha,
2008).
Such issues concern the wider theory in which the present
work is embedded. Theory of mind research has energized
research into topics in adjacent domains (e.g., Fink et al.,
2015, on friendship; Freeman et al., 2000, on numeracy).
Pictorial reasoning emerges as a distinct domain which becomes
developmentally enriched by mentalistic reasoning. There are
developmental differences between the theory of mind domain
and pictorial reasoning. Even in preschool, there are empirical
differences between passing procedurally matched false belief
tests and outdated picture tests (e.g., Peterson and Siegel,
1998). It appears that after the age of 5 years, children begin
the conceptual work of incorporating a representation of the
viewer into that of an artist. Artists are supposed to show
their work to others, and the work is supposed to be genuine
lest viewers lose trust. The process of such acquisition may be
characterized as one of moving from a fixation on pictorial
beauty and moral integrity to a mentalistic conception of the
art domain. Possibly, ‘Children might call a picture that looks
like a bird “a bird” not merely because it looks like a bird, but
because its appearance makes it likely that it was created with
the intent to represent a bird. In general, appearance – and
shape in particular – is seen as an excellent cue to intention’
(Bloom and Markson, 1998, p. 203). In that respect, there
opens a two-way relation between theory of mind and theory
of art: visual communication (Freedman and Stuhr, 2004).
Eight-years-old remain an intriguing group in the throes of
acquisition, where alongside making predictions about them it is
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important to discover hitherto-hidden facets of their reasoning.
Whereas, Study 1 and half of Study 2 tested hypotheses, the
other half of Studies 2 and 3 were steps in exploring the range
of possibilities that the domain affords.
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